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In Pari Delicto Doctrine May Bar
Receiver's Third-Party Claims
Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts, Inc., et al.
Reynolds B. Brissenden, IV*
INTRODUCTION
A general understanding exists among bankruptcy and commercial
lawyers that the doctrine of in pari delicto1 is applicable as a defense
against third-party claims asserted by trustees in corporate bankruptcy
cases but is not applicable as a defense against third-party claims as-
serted by receivers in corporate receivership cases. This general un-
derstanding stemming from the Heartland Financial Services, Inc.
receivership.
In the wake of recent mass fraud bankruptcies (e.g., Enron and
Worldcom) where third-party advisors have allegedly participated in
or passively failed to discover and/or disclose management's fraudu-
lent activity, a number of articles have recently been published calling
upon federal courts in bankruptcy cases to adopt the same rationale
followed in receivership cases for not applying the doctrine of in pari
delicto.2 One such receivership case commonly cited and discussed is
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision of Scholes v. Lehman.3
However, the Seventh Circuit in the case of Knauer v. Jonathon Rob-
* Reynolds B. Brissenden is an attorney with Kroger, Gardis & Regas in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana practicing in the areas of business and commercial litigation. Kroger, Gardis & Regas repre-
sented the receiver, James A. Knauer in Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts, Inc., et al. and other
litigation stemming from the receivership. Mr. Brissenden would like to thank James Knaver
and William Bock, III for their comments and support and Tammy Bolin for her assistance.
1. The defense of in pari delicto refers to "equal fault or guilt". BLACK'S LAW DIC-rIONARY
791 (6th ed. 1990). With the merger of law and equity, the doctrine of in pari delicto is a "coun-
terpart" of the equitable defense of unclean hands, which "forbade a plaintiff to recover dam-
ages if his fault was equal to the defendant's." Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989).
The in pari delicto maxim is closely related and considered a corollary of the unclean hands
maxim. 27A Am.Jur.2d, Equity § 132, citing, Morrissey v. Bologna, 123 So.2d 537 (Miss. 1960).
2. Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in The Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari
Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305
(2003); Making Sense of the In Pari Delicto Defense: "Who's Zoomin' Who?" 23 No.11 BANKR.
L. LETTER 1 (Nov. 2003); Jordan A. Kroop, A Ponzi Scheme And A "Pointless Technicality", 2
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26 (2002).
3. Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995).
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erts, Inc.,4 revisited the issue and significantly limited the approach
previously followed by the court in Scholes. The approach followed
by the court in Knauer lessens the legal significance of the appoint-
ment of a receiver in relation to the in pari delicto doctrine, limiting a
receiver's ability to pursue certain third-party claims.
The Knauer and Scholes decisions involved litigation arising from
the operation of Ponzi schemes 5 and fraudulent misconduct by the
principals of corporations causing injury to the business entities them-
selves and to creditors. However, the Knauer decision leaves no rem-
edy for injuries caused to a corporate entity, particularly where the
claims asserted by the receiver are found to belong to the corporate
entity and thus the receiver and not the creditors of the receivership
estate, i.e., the investors. Thus, third-party defendants are able to as-
sert the defense as a shield to escape liability, producing an inequita-
ble result.
This Article seeks to put the Seventh Circuit's decision in context.
It provides an overview of pertinent bankruptcy and receivership deci-
sions leading up to the Knauer decision. It describes the factual and
procedural history of Knauer and examines the Seventh Circuit's ra-
tionale. Finally, the Article examines other court decisions in receiv-
ership cases following the Knauer decision. Thus it seeks to explore
some of the consequences of the Knauer decision upon the applicabil-
ity of the in pari delicto doctrine in the context of receivership cases.
OVERVIEW OF IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
Federal courts addressing the in pari delicto doctrine in the context
of bankruptcy cases recognize the distinction between equitable re-
ceivership law and federal bankruptcy law mandating different treat-
ment of the in pari delicto defense in the bankruptcy context.6
4. Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts, Inc., et al. 348 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 2003).
5. "A Ponzi scheme involves individuals,...,who convince investors to purchase interests in
phony or unprofitable investment schemes, paying off old investors with the money obtained
from new investors." United States v. Frykholm, 267 F.3d 604, n.1 (7th Cir. 2001). "The term
'Ponzi Scheme' is derived from Charles Ponzi, a famous Boston swindler. With a capital of $150,
Ponzi began to borrow money on his own promissory notes at a 50% rate of interest payable in
90 days. Ponzi collected nearly $10 million in 8 months beginning in 1919, using the funds of new
investors to pay off those whose notes had come due." United States v. Masten, 170 F.3d 790,
797 n.9 (7th Cir. 1999).
6. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322
F.3d 147 (2d. Cir. 2003); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267
F.3d 340 (3rd Cir. 2001); In re Dublin Securities, Inc., 133 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1997); In re:
Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996); Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 72 F.3d 1085 (2d. Cir. 1995); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d.
Cir. 1991); In re Donahue Sec., Inc., 304 B.R. 797 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
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The Third Circuit's opinion in Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc.,7 clearly illustrates the distinc-
tion drawn by the courts. In R.F. Lafferty, litigation arose from the
misconduct of wrongdoers who used corporate entities as tools to con-
duct a Ponzi scheme. 8 Two principal wrongdoers, William Shapiro
and Kenneth Shapiro controlled and operated two equipment leasing
companies. 9 The Shapiros, together with the assistance of legal coun-
sel, brokers, and underwriters, fraudulently mismanaged their compa-
nies and expanded the corporations' debt out of proportion with its
ability to pay, resulting in the deepening insolvency of the corpora-
tions.10 The principal wrongdoers sought bankruptcy relief for the
two corporate entities under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.11 Thereafter, a trustee was appointed and by stipulation, an
official committee of unsecured creditors ("Committee") was formed
and authorized to pursue claims on behalf of the bankrupt
corporations.12
In turn, the Committee filed suit against the principal wrongdoers
as well as the corporations' brokers, underwriters and accountants
("third-parties") alleging violations of the Securities & Exchange Act,
and asserting state law claims of breach of contract, misrepresenta-
tion, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.1 3 In response, the
third-parties filed motions to dismiss contending the Committee's
claims were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.14 The district
court stated that the Committee - analogous to a trustee-did not rise
above defenses that are available against the debtor corporations. 15
The district court relied upon prior federal court decisions in bank-
ruptcy cases for the principle that in bankruptcy cases the property of
the estate is defined within section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
7. R.F. Lafferty. 267 F.3d at 340.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 345. Under the stipulation, the Committee effectively acquired
all the attributes of a bankruptcy trustee. Id.
13. Id. at 346.
14. In re Walnut Leasing Co., Inc., 1999 WL 729267 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1999). The defend-
ants in their motions to dismiss also argued that the Committee lacked standing in that it was not
the corporations that were injured but rather the creditors of the estate and that the claims being
asserted belonged to the creditors not the bankrupt corporations. The District Court however
found the injury, i.e., the deepening insolvency, to be a cognizable injury to corporate debtors
rather than to creditors, thus the corporations and not the creditors had standing to pursue the
claims asserted.
15. Id. at *4 (citing, Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d
1149, 1154 and n.7 (3rd Cir. 1989)).
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as "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor as of the commence-
ment of the case", which includes causes of action". 16 Therefore, the
"estate's rights are no stronger than they were when actually held by
the debtors.' 7
The district court went on to point out the distinction of the applica-
bility of the in pari delicto doctrine to bar third-party claims asserted
by trustees in bankruptcy cases and its non-applicability in receiver-
ship cases.' 8 The court stated, "The Committee is not analogous to a
receiver or liquidator, for which reasons this case is distinguishable
from the cases that hold a receiver is not subject to defenses based on
inequitable conduct or unclean hands."' 9 Therefore, the district court
concluded that since the complaint alleged that the corporations, act-
ing through the principal wrongdoers, perpetrated the Ponzi scheme
with the assistance of the brokers, underwriters and accountants that
the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the Committee from asserting
third-party claims.20
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed both the standing of the
Committee to assert third-party claims and the application of the in
pari delicto doctrine. The court first confirmed that the corporations,
although used by the principal wrongdoers as tools to commit a fraud,
nonetheless maintained an identity separate from the wrongdoers
which may have suffered a distinct and separate injury which could
not be ruled out at the motion to dismiss stage. 21 The Third Circuit
next examined the issue of in pari delicto. The Third Circuit set forth
a two step analysis: first, whether the court could consider post-peti-
tion events that may affect an equitable defense (the appointment of a
trustee after the petition for bankruptcy was filed) and second,
whether the misconduct by the wrongdoers should in fact be imputed
to the corporations such that the doctrine of in pari delicto bars the
Committee's claims.22
In relation to the first step, the Committee argued that its status as
an innocent successor justified not applying the doctrine since the fact
of bankruptcy and the resulting removal of the wrongdoers from man-
agement of the corporations prevented bad actors from benefiting
16. In re Walnut Leasing 1999 WL 729267 at *4.
17. Id. (quoting, In re Hedged-Investments, 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996)).
18. Id.
19. Id.; citing, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 18 (9th Cir. 1995);
See, e.g., In re Hedged-Investments, 84 F.3d at 1284, n.5.
20. In Re Walnut Leasing, 1999 WL 729267 at *5.
21. R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 354.
22. Id. at 354-355.
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from any recovery by the corporations.23 However, the Third Circuit
noted that in bankruptcy cases, section 541 of Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code governs such claims and directs courts to evaluate de-
fenses as they existed at the commencement of the bankruptcy.24 The
court concluded that the plain language of section 541 prevented
courts from taking into account post-petition events and therefore the
in pari delicto doctrine was applicable to the third-party claims as-
serted by the Committee.25 In response to the Committee's citation to
and reliance upon principles followed in receivership cases, the Third
Circuit clearly drew the distinction between bankruptcy cases and re-
ceivership case:
We certainly acknowledge that, in the receivership context, several
courts have declined to apply in pari delicto to bar the receiver from
asserting the claims of an insolvent corporation on the ground that
application of the doctrine to an innocent successor would be ineq-
uitable. These courts have thought it proper to consider events aris-
ing after a corporation enters into receivership... These cases are
easily distinguishable, however; unlike bankruptcy trustees, receiv-
ers are not subject to the limits of section 541.26
Examining the second step of its analysis, the Third Circuit found
that the fraudulent conduct of the principal wrongdoers could be im-
puted to the corporations. 27 This is due to the fact the wrongdoers
perpetrated the fraud in the course of their employment and since,
even though the wrongdoers acted adversely to the interests of the
corporations, they were the sole actors engaged in the alleged wrong-
doing.28 Thus, the court affirmed dismissal of the third-party claims.
29
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Cowen expressed his disagreement
with the majority's view of the distinction between bankruptcy cases
and receivership cases.30 He called their decision not to follow the
reasoning set forth in receivership case and not to consider post-peti-
tion events due to the language of section 541(a) a "pointless
technicality".31
23. Id. at 355-356.
24. Id. at 356.
25. Id. at 357.
26. R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358.
27. Id. at 360.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 362.
31. R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358.
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OVERVIEW OF IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE IN
RECEIVERSHIP CASES
Federal courts addressing the in pari delicto doctrine in the context
of receivership cases have declined to apply the in pari delicto doctrine
to bar a receiver from asserting claims of an insolvent corporation. 32
In Scholes v. Lehman, the wrongdoer created three corporations for
orchestrating a Ponzi scheme, raising $30 million from investors.33
Following the appointment of a receiver to the corporations, the re-
ceiver pursued state law claims of fraudulent-conveyance against
third-party defendants including the wrongdoer's ex-wife, charities
and one investor who received "profits" from the corporations. 34 The
third-party defendants raised the in pari delicto defense in response to
the receiver's efforts to recover assets fraudulently conveyed to them
through the Ponzi scheme, arguing the receiver's claims were barred.35
The Seventh Circuit however reasoned:
That although injured by [the wrongdoer], the corporations would
not be heard to complain as long as they were controlled by him,
not only because he would not permit them to complain but also
because of their deep, their utter, complicity in [the wrongdoer's]
fraud. 36
The court further explained the legal significance of the appointment
of a receiver in relation to the in pari delicto doctrine:
. . .the wrongdoer must not be allowed to profit from his
wrong... [but] [t]hat reason falls out now that [the wrongdoer] has
been ousted from control of and beneficial interest in the corpora-
tions. The appointment of the receiver removed the wrongdoer
from the scene. The corporations were no more [the wrongdoer's]
evil zombies. Freed from the spell, they became entitled to the re-
turn of the moneys - for the benefit not of [the wrongdoer] but of
innocent investors...
32. Scholes, 56 F.3d 750; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir.
1995); Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849 (M.D. La. 1997).
33. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 754.
34. Id.
35. Id. (The third-party defendants in their motion to dismiss also argued the receiver lacked
standing in that it was not the corporations that were injured but rather the creditors of the
estate and that the claims being asserted belong to the creditors not the corporations. The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected this argument as follows: "The answer - so far as the corporations are
concerned, and we need go no further - turns out to be straightforward. The corporations, [the
wrongdoer's] robotic tools, were nevertheless in the eyes of the law separate legal entities with
rights and duties. They received money from unsuspecting, if perhaps greedy and foolish inves-
tors. That money should have been used for the stated purpose of the corporation... Instead [the
wrongdoer] caused the corporation to pay out the money they received to himself, his ex-wife,
his favorite charities, and an investor .. ". The court concluded that such transfers by the princi-
pal from the entities for an unauthorized purpose injured the corporations).
36. Id. at 754-755.
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Put differently, the defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the
person who is in pari delicto is eliminated ...
The court concluded that now that the corporations which were cre-
ated and initially controlled by the wrongdoer are controlled by a re-
ceiver whose object is to maximize the value of the corporations for
the benefit of their investors and any creditors, we cannot see an ob-
jection to the receiver bringing suit to recover corporate assets unlaw-
fully dissipated by [the wrongdoer].3 7
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the in pari delicto defense was
not applicable against the receiver since the wrongdoer who had pre-
viously controlled the receivership entity had been removed.3 The
appointment of a receiver removed the wrongdoer from the scene.
3 9
Therefore, the wrongdoer will not profit from any recovery by the
receiver asserting the claims.
40
The Ninth Circuit has likewise held the equitable defense based on
a party's unclean hands does not apply against a receiver. 41 In Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation ("FDIC") as receiver for a failed savings and loan
("S&L"), sued the former counsel of the S&L for legal malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duty. The former counsel raised the equitable
defense of in pari delicto and argued that the receiver was barred from
bringing claims against third parties due to the entity's unclean hands.
The Ninth Circuit held that the receiver was not barred by the in
pari delicto doctrine from asserting claims against third-parties.42 The
Ninth Circuit recognized the general rule that, "a receiver occupies no
better position than that which was occupied by the person or party
for whom he acts and any defense good against the original party is
good against the receiver. '43 The Ninth Circuit went on to state how-
ever, that this general rule is subject to exceptions including, "de-
fenses based on a party's unclean hands or inequitable conduct do not
generally apply against that party's receiver. '44 The Ninth Circuit fur-
ther noted that, while a party may itself be denied a right or defense
on account of its misdeeds, there is little reason to impose the same
37. Id. at 755.
38. Id. at 754-755.
39. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 754-755.
40. Id.
41. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id., citing Allen v. Ramsay, 179 Cal. App. 2d 843, 854 (1960).
44. Id.
20051
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punishment on a receiver that steps into the party's shoes pursuant to
a court order.45 The court explained:
A receiver, like a bankruptcy trustee and unlike a normal successor
in interest, does not voluntarily step into the shoes of the [entity]; it
is thrust into those shoes. It was neither a party to the original ineq-
uitable conduct nor is it in position to take action prior to assuming
the [entity's] assets to cure any associated defects or force the [en-
tity] to pay for incurable defects.46
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise would
allow the opposing party to enjoy a windfall.47 The Ninth Circuit
concluded:
In light of these considerations, we conclude that the equities be-
tween a party asserting an equitable defense and a[n entity not in
receivership] are at such variance with the equities between the
party and a receiver of the [entity] that equitable defenses good
against the [entity] should not be available against the receiver. To
hold otherwise would be to elevate form over substance-some-
thing courts sitting in equity traditionally will not do.48
The non-applicability of the in pari delicto defense in receivership
cases as opposed to bankruptcy cases has also been discussed in the
case of Hannover Corp. of America v. Beckner.49 In Beckner, litiga-
tion arose from an underlying SEC enforcement action brought
against the plaintiff corporations and two wrongdoers.5 0 During the
course of the SEC's case, the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Louisiana, appointed a receiver on behalf of the corporations.5 1
Two months after the receiver was appointed, the receiver peti-
tioned for bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana and the corporations became debtors-in-
possession pursuant to a liquidating plan of reorganization with the
receiver also acting as the administrator of the debtors-in-posses-
sion.52 The corporations acting through their appointed receiver filed
suit against the corporations' counsel and law firm as well as their
malpractice insurance carrier, alleging inter alia negligence and
malpractice. 53
45. Id.
46. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 61 F.3d at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849 (M.D. La. 1997).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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In response, defendants filed motions to dismiss arguing the claims
were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. However, the Beckner
court rejected the defendant's argument holding that the doctrine of
in pari delicto did not bar the receiver's claims.54 Rather, the court
found the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Scholes "highly persuasive,
both for its legal logic and common sense approach. ' 55 The court
stated:
Specifically, the [Seventh Circuit] court looked at the rationale un-
derlying the in pari delicto doctrine B that the wrongdoer must not
be allowed to profit from his wrong by recovering property that he
had parted with in order to thwart his creditors. The [Seventh Cir-
cuit] court noted that this reason for in pari delicto defense vanished
upon the appointment of the receiver and removal of the wrong-
doer from control and beneficial interest in the corporations.
56
The court further rejected defendants' reliance upon the bankruptcy
case, In re Hedged Investments Associates, Inc.57 and distinguished the
case on the basis of the appointment of a receiver rather than a bank-
ruptcy trustee.5 8 Although the corporations entered into bankruptcy,
a receiver was appointed before the corporations filed for bankruptcy
protection.5 9 Therefore, the corporations were freed from the wrong-
doers when they filed bankruptcy and were not subject to the sting of
the in pari delicto doctrine upon the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.60
THE FACTS OF KNAUER V. JONATHON ROBERTS, INC., ET. AL.
Heartland Financial Services, Inc. ("Heartland") was founded by
Kenneth R. Payne ("Payne") in January 1991 as a brokerage, insur-
ance and estate planning firm. Payne was Heartland's president and
54. Hannover, 211 B.R. at 852.
55. Id. at 858.
56. Id.
57. The Tenth Circuit in the Hedged Investments case also noted the distinction between the
applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine in the receivership context vis-a-vis the bankruptcy
context and specifically approved of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in the Scholes case stating:
[The trustee] asks us to apply the "evil zombie" rule announced in Scholes to this case.
Now that the partnership represented by the [trustee] is free of [the wrongdoer] and
[the entities'] evil spell, misrepresentations to Defendant are no longer relevant.
Though the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Scholes enjoys a certain appeal, both from
doctrinal and public policy perspectives, we cannot adopt it in this case. Put most sim-
ply, [a trustee] is a bankruptcy trustee acting under 11 U.S.C. § 541, and bankruptcy
law, apparently unlike the law of receivership, expressly prohibits the result [the trus-
tee] urges.
In re Hedged-Investments Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1996).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 859.
60. Id.
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Daniel Danker ("Danker") was its vice-president. Heartland was not
registered with the SEC. Payne and Danker were licensed securities
brokers. At various times from 1996 to 2000, several different broker
dealers held their licenses making Payne and Danker registered secur-
ities representatives of the firms. As a result, Payne and Danker had
the ability to represent to investors they were members of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the invest-
ments were protected by Securities Investors Protection Corporation
("SIPC").
For several years, Payne and Danker operated Heartland as a legiti-
mate firm. However, commencing in 1994, and continuing through
August, 2001, Payne and Danker, directly and indirectly, through
Heartland and other affiliated companies engaged in a massive, fraud-
ulent Ponzi scheme whereby they held themselves out as licensed reg-
istered securities representatives and induced investors to invest
millions of dollars through the fraudulent sale of securities. Investors
were told that their investments would be used to purchase securities
and were promised a high rate of return.
Though a nominal amount of investor funds were used to purchase
securities, most of the investments were never made. Rather, the in-
vestors' money was used to perpetuate the Ponzi scheme and/or pay
the personal and business expenses of Payne, Danker and Heartland.
Payne and Danker wrongfully converted the funds to their own use
and personal benefit or to that of others. Meanwhile, investors were
sent fraudulent confirmations and monthly statements on Heartland
letterhead and/or that of the affiliated company which indicated the
investments were earning high rates of return.
By 1998, Heartland purportedly had over 700 clients and approxi-
mately $22.6 million in assets (investor funds). From at least January
1998 through August 2000, Payne and Danker raised another $29.1
million from at least 330 investors. Additionally, from December
1997 through at least December 1999, Payne and Danker raised at
least another $18.5 million from at least 257 investors through an affil-
iated company.
In the end, Payne and Danker collected in excess of $60 million
dollars from investors. Danker has been convicted of wire fraud and
money laundering. Payne has been convicted of mail fraud and
money laundering. Both were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences.
THE HISTORY OF KNAUER v. JONATHON ROBERTS, INC., ET. AL.
On August 10, 2000, the SEC instigated an action in the Southern
district court of Indiana against Payne, Danker and Heartland. As a
[Vol. 3:169
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part of the proceedings, the district court removed Payne and Danker
from control of Heartland and appointed James Knauer receiver.
Thereafter, on August 10, 2001, Knauer filed his complaint against the
brokerage firms who held the security licenses of Payne and Danker
at various times, asserting various state law claims. The claims as-
serted included negligent hiring, negligent supervision and monitoring
of Payne and Danker and for fraud and conversion based on the bro-
kerage firm's liability for the actions of their registered agents. The
receiver asserted that the brokerage firm's actions or failure to act
caused direct injury to Heartland and permitted millions of dollars to
be misappropriated from Heartland.
In response, the brokerage firms filed motions to dismiss asserting,
inter alia, the receiver lacked standing to assert the claims and the
claims were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.61 In support of
their argument, the brokerage firms primarily relied upon bankruptcy
case law.
The district court agreed that the receiver had alleged injury to
Heartland and that the claims brought by the receiver against the bro-
kerage firms belonged solely to the receiver and not to the investors in
Heartland.62 However, the district court ruled that the doctrine of in
pari delicto barred the receiver's claims.63 The district court, rather
than focusing on whether the equitable defense was applicable post-
appointment of the receiver after the wrongdoers were removed from
the scene, focused upon whether the wrongful conduct could be im-
puted to Heartland, citing R.F. Lafferty64 The court noted the com-
plaint expressly alleged that Heartland participated in the scheme and
had knowledge of the fraudulent activities, thereby proceeding to find
the claims were barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.65 The district
court distinguished the Scholes decision on the basis that the receiver
in Scholes was asserting a fraudulent conveyance claim rather than
state tort law claims. 66
61. Keeping in mind the in pari delicto doctrine is an affirmative defense and generally depen-
dent upon the facts, a court may nevertheless address the issue in a motion to dismiss, pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the allegations of the complaint are taken as true, and the
complaint provides sufficient allegations of fact for the court to perform an equitable balancing
test. However, in cases where less factual detail is alleged in the complaint, a court will probably
leave the issue to be addressed in a motion for summary judgment.
62. Knauer v. Jonathon Roberts, Inc., et. al., 2002 WL 31431484 at *7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30,
2000).
63. Id. at *7-8.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *8.
66. Id.
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On appeal, the receiver argued the district court improperly failed
to apply the reasoning of Scholes and other receivership case law and
dismissed the claims based solely upon the application of the in pari
delicto doctrine in the context of a corporate receivership. The re-
ceiver also contended the district court chose to base its decision upon
bankruptcy case law, overlooking a clear distinction between the ap-
plication of the in pari delicto doctrine in bankruptcy cases versus re-
ceivership cases.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
In Knauer v. Johnathan Roberts, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held the
doctrine of in pari delicto barred the receiver's third-party claims
against the brokerage firms.67 Surprisingly, the court re-examined the
teachings of Scholes and reined in the breadth of its earlier decision.
The court determined that while Scholes may recommend a "generous
approach" toward certain lawsuits brought by corporate receivers,
even where the corporation has been complicit in the misconduct, the
court would look to state law to provide context to Scholes.68 Yet, the
court recognized that no Indiana case law had addressed the issue.69
Nevertheless, the court cited a decision by the Indiana Supreme
Court from 1908 indicating the general rule in an "ordinary" receiver-
ship is that the receiver can only sue in the right of the corporation,
which subjects him to all of the equities which would have been avail-
able against the corporation. 70 However, in a "non-ordinary" receiv-
ership (i.e., one involving fraud - and perhaps one such as this where
a Ponzi scheme raised $60 million from investors) the general rule that
a receivership stands in the shoes of the corporation is subject to an
exception.71 The exception is that the receiver may pursue claims or
defend claims in some circumstances where the corporation might
have been estopped by its own fraud.72 One such circumstance in-
volves allowing receivers to avoid transactions which constitute fraud-
ulent conveyances and violate the rights of creditors, like the claims
asserted in the Scholes case. 73
But the Knauer court lost sight of the type of receivership involved
and the legal significance of appointing a receiver in relation to the in
67. 348 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 2003).
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 236 (citing, Marion Trust Co. v. Blish, 170 Ind. 686, 84 N.E. 814, 816 (1908)).
71. Id.
72. Knauer, 348 F.3d at 236 (citing, 7 INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Corporations §181).
73. Id. (citing, Hamond v. Cline, 170 Ind. 452, 84 N.E. 827, 828 (1908)).
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pari delicto doctrine. Instead the court focused its analysis upon the
type of third-party claims being asserted (fraudulent conveyance or
tort claims) by the receiver and proceeded to limit the teachings of the
Scholes decision. The court drew the line at fraudulent conveyance
claims against third-parties stating, "If the case before us involved the
voiding of a fraudulent conveyance, as in Scholes or the Indiana cases
just cited, we would likely apply Scholes. . .This case, however,
presents a different equitable alignment. The key difference, for pur-
poses of equity... is the identity of the defendants. 74
The court then proceeded to engage in an "equitable balancing
test," considering various factors, including the identity of the parties.
The court found as a matter of fact, based upon the allegations of the
complaint, that the brokerage firms derived no benefit from diversion
of funds but were allegedly partly to blame for their occurrence. 75
The court next found that Heartland and JMS (an affiliated entity)
were charged with fault at least equal to that of the broker dealers,
and were very much at the forefront of the Ponzi scheme. ' 76 The
court noted, "[i]n sum, all of the liability, according to the complaint,
arises from the employment or agency relationship between the bro-
ker dealer defendants and Payne and Danker". 77 The court reasoned
that had the broker dealers been directly involved in the embezzle-
ments, or attained some tangible benefit from them, this would be a
different case.78 "The basic equity is that a broker dealer, which ap-
parently had little to do with the Ponzi scheme, should not be liable to
Heartland, which was deeply complicit in the crimes."'79
The court recognized its teachings in Scholes as true; that the ap-
pointment of a receiver removes the wrongdoer from control of the
corporation and from the scene, and separates the receiver from the
wrongdoer's past crimes.80 However, the court limited Scholes, rea-
soning the "extent of the separation" is an equitable determination.81
Despite the appointment of a receiver, the court found as a matter of
fact that the relationship or "nexus" between the wrongdoers and the
corporate entities was far more immediate than the relationship be-
tween the wrongdoers and the brokerage firms.82 Therefore, the court
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 237.
77. Knauer, 348 F.3d at 237.
78. Id., at n.6.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 238.
81. Id.
82. Knauer, 348 F.3d at 238.
2005]
182 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
concluded the broker dealers should not be deprived of the defense of
in pari delicto.83
The court's opinion alters the general understanding that the in pari
delicto doctrine does apply in bankruptcy cases and does not apply in
receivership cases. The Knauer decision indicates that in receivership
cases, determining whether the in pari delicto doctrine applies is not
based solely upon the doctrine's underlying rationale. Rather, courts
may also perform an "equitable balancing test," considering the con-
text in which the defense is being applied and such factors as (1) the
types of third-party claims being asserted by the receiver (fraudulent
conveyance claims to recover assets versus tort claims for injury to the
corporate entity), (2) the role of the third-party defendants in the
Ponzi scheme in relation to the corporate entity (direct, active partici-
pation versus passive conduct or a failure to act), (3) the benefit, if
any, received by the defendants from the Ponzi scheme and, (4) the
extent of separation between the wrongdoers and the corporate enti-
ties compared to the third-party defendants.
By focusing on these factors, the court lost sight of the underlying
rationale of the in pari delicto doctrine and the legal significance of
appointing a receiver over a corporate entity. The appointment of a
receiver removes the wrongdoer from control of the corporation, thus
preventing the wrongdoer from profiting or recovering from claims
asserted by the receiver against third-parties. Limiting the reasoning
in Scholes to fraudulent conveyance claims also overlooks the ratio-
nale for allowing receivers appointed in "non-ordinary" receiverships
to pursue fraudulent conveyance claims. When pursuing third-party
claims which belong to the corporate entities in "non-ordinary" re-
ceiverships involving fraud, a receiver should not be subject to the
same defenses applicable to the corporate entities, pre-appointment.
The court also lessened the legal significance of the appointment of
a receiver by focusing on the "extent of the separation" between the
wrongdoers and the corporate entities, compared to that between the
wrongdoers and third-party defendants. This factor alone will in most,
if not all, receivership cases where corporate entities are used as tools
in carrying out Ponzi schemes, weigh in favor of the third-party defen-
dant since the wrongdoers are typically controlling officers and/or di-
rectors of the corporate entities. In Knauer, the relationships between
the wrongdoers and the brokerage firms were arguably just as imme-
diate because Payne and Danker were registered securities represent-
atives of the brokerage firms. Also, considering whether the third-
83. Id.
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party defendants were actively participating in and benefiting from
the Ponzi scheme will also often weigh against a receiver asserting
claims against third-party defendants, particularly where third-parties
passively fail to discover and/or disclose management's fraudulent ac-
tivity. These factors allow third-party defendants to wrongfully use
the in pari delicto doctrine to shield themselves from liability where
the wrongdoer can no longer benefit from any recovery.
THE IMPACT OF THE KNAUER DECISION ON RECEIVERSHIP CASES
Following the Knauer decision, the Southern District Court of Indi-
ana was faced with the same issue in Marwil v. Farah.84 In Marwil, the
court appointed a receiver over a corporate entity operated by wrong-
doers in a Ponzi scheme, raising nearly $85 million from investors who
believed their investments were being used primarily for interest-
bearing loans to local churches. The receiver asserted a fraudulent
conveyance claim and sought the disgorgement of funds from a third-
party defendant that received the funds as a part of a "bargain-sale"
transaction.8 5 In response, the third-party defendant moved for judg-
ment on the pleadings asserting the defense of in pari delicto as a basis
for barring the receiver's claims.
The district court commented on the teachings of the Knauer deci-
sion, and understood the main distinction between Scholes and
Knauer as being the type of claims asserted by the receiver (fraudu-
lent conveyance versus tort claims).8 6 The court further opined: "In
pari delicto was appropriate in Knauer because the equitable balanc-
ing favored the defendants, who had not seen a cent of the diverted
funds and 'whose involvement in the Ponzi scheme as a whole was
quite minor'.. .On the other side of the equation, the Ponzi entities, as
a result of the machinations of Payne, 'were very much at the fore-
front of the Ponzi scheme." 8 7 The court concluded however based
upon the pleadings alone, that it could not apply the equitable balanc-
ing test and determine whether the "equitable alignment" of the par-
ties appeared to resemble the equitable alignment in Scholes or
Knauer more closely.88
The Southern District Court of Indiana has recently had a second
opportunity to interpret and comment upon the teachings of the
84. Marwil v. Farah, 2003 WL 23095657 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id. at *9.
87. Id. (citing, Knauer, 248 F.3d at 236).
88. Id.
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Knauer decision.8 9 In Baker, the court stated: "[The wrongdoer's] re-
moval from [the corporate entities] lessens the "sting" of in pari delicto
to some degree... but does not totally exculpate the entity." 90 Clearly
the district court now views the appointment of a receiver as having
less legal significance in relation to the in pari delicto doctrine.
Most recently, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania consid-
ered the application of the in pari delicto doctrine in a receivership
case similar to the Knauer case.91 In Marion v. TDI, Inc.,92 a wrong-
doer used corporations as a tool to conduct a Ponzi scheme where
investors believed they were purchasing federally insured certificates
of deposits, when in fact they were purchasing unregistered
"IOU's. ' '93 The scheme raised $4 billion from investors.94 Following
his appointment as a receiver over the corporate entities, the receiver
asserted third-party tort claims, including negligent supervision,
against the broker dealers.95 Defendants in response moved to dis-
miss arguing the receiver's claims were barred by the doctrine of in
pari delicto.96 However, it appears the Marion court did not follow
Knauer, placing more emphasis upon the legal significance of the ap-
pointment of a receiver. The court explained, "the plaintiff, receiver,
as an innocent successor-in-interest, does not suffer from the same
handicap. ... [T]he defense of in pari delicto 'loses its sting' when the
bad actor is eliminated. '97
CONCLUSION
Prior to the Knauer decision, federal courts in the Scholes,
O'Melveny and Beckner decisions had maintained a bright line as to
the non-applicability of the in pari delicto doctrine to receivership
cases. This bright line was also recognized by federal courts in bank-
ruptcy cases. Of significance is the reasoning that after the appoint-
ment of a receiver the in pari delicto doctrine "loses its sting." To hold
otherwise would allow the opposing party to enjoy a windfall, which
might be justifiable against the wrongdoer but not as to a liberated
89. Baker O'Neal Holdings, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2004 WL 771230 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
90. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
91. Marion v. TDI, Inc., 2004 WL 1175740 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Marion at *1.
97. Id. at *3 (citing In re Personal and Business Ins. Agency, 334 F.3d 239, 246 (3rd Cir. 2003);
R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 358; see, e.g., O'Melvery & Myers, 61 F.3d at 19; see Knauer, 348 F.3d
230) (emphasis added).
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corporate entity and its innocent creditors. This reasoning is particu-
larly applicable to receivership cases involving Ponzi schemes where
the claims are found to belong to the corporate entity (and thus the
receiver) and not to the innocent creditors. Had the innocent inves-
tors asserted the same claims, either individually or via class action,
against the brokerage firms, the court would have dismissed for lack
of standing. Thus, barring a receiver's claims against third-parties al-
lows claims for injury caused to the corporate entity to be without a
remedy, producing an inequitable result.
By limiting the rationale followed in Scholes, the Knauer decision
teaches courts the appointment of a receiver only "lessens" the sting
of the in pari delicto doctrine and to engage in an "equitable balanc-
ing" of the parties to determine whether to apply the in pari delicto
doctrine. This approach allows courts to overlook the legal signifi-
cance of the appointment of a receiver in relation to the in pari delicto
doctrine. Removing the wrongdoer from the scene erodes the under-
lying rationale for applying the in pari delicto doctrine. Courts should
not lose site of this legal significance. With the wrongdoers removed
from control of business entities, any recovery by the receiver from
third-party defendants, whether through fraudulent conveyance
claims or tort claims, will ultimately inure to the benefit of the receiv-
ership estate and thus the innocent creditors, the true victims of any
scam.
The doctrine of in pari delicto works to preclude wrongdoers from
profiting by their unlawful acts. Conversely, it should not be used by
third-parties to shield themselves from liability where the wrongdoer
can no longer benefit from any recovery.
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